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Abstract 
 
This paper presents results from two large-scale natural field experiments 
that tested the effect of social norm messages on tax compliance.  Using 
administrative data from more than 200,000 individuals in the United 
Kingdom, we show that including social norm messages in standard 
reminder letters increases payment rates for overdue tax.  This result offers 
a rare example of social norm messages affecting tax compliance behavior 
in a real world setting. We find no evidence that loss framing is more 
effective than gain framing.  Descriptive norms appear to be more 
effective than injunctive norms.  Messages referring to public services or 
financial information also significantly increased payment rates.  The field 
experiments accelerated the collection of tax revenue at little cost.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Understanding how to motivate individuals to pay their taxes has become a major issue for 
research in economics and public policy (Andreoni et al., 1998).  The pioneers in this area were 
Allingham and Sandmo (AS) (1972), who adapted the Becker (1968) model to analyse the factors 
that influence the decision to evade tax.  Their model predicts that tax evasion rates fall as the 
probability of detection and the degree of punishment increases.  Various empirical approaches 
have been employed to test the AS model; notably, recent years have seen a surge in the use of 
field experiments (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Ariel, 2012; Del Carpio, 2013; 
Carrillo et al., 2014; Gangl et al., 2014; Bott et al., 2014; Pomeranz, 2015; Castro & Scartascini, 
2015; Dwenger et al., 2016).1  
The great majority of studies have, however, focused on the initial decision to declare or 
disclose income to the government.  This paper has a different emphasis.  Rather than analysing 
the honest declaration of income, we use large-scale natural field experiments to examine the 
factors that influence timely payment of taxes.  Such an exploration is relevant because an 
estimated 16% of the gross tax gap in the US is from enforced or late payment (Slemrod, 2007).  
Focusing on tax payments offers significant practical advantages over income declaration.  For 
instance, rather than inferring compliance from changes in the level of income declared, there is a 
tighter causal link between intervention and behavior: a known tax amount is outstanding, a 
message requests payment, and the official tax record shows whether the payment has been made.  
Of course, our sample consists only of non-compliant taxpayers who initially declared their 
income to the government, so our results are only externally valid for this population of taxpayers.   
The inspiration for our treatments comes from the growing literature suggesting that moral 
costs can be an important mechanism for changing human behavior (Levitt & List, 2007).  While 
such a mechanism has been advocated in the theoretical literature (Postlewaite, 2010), there are 
few field experimental studies of its efficacy.  We present two natural field experiments that test 
the impact of tax payment reminders featuring messages aimed at increasing moral costs.   
The first natural field experiment we present was carried out with the United Kingdom tax 
administration authority (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)) and the then UK Cabinet 
                                                 
1 Hallsworth (2014) gives an overview of these field experiments and places the current study in the context of other 
similar projects. There are also field experiments that provide relevant findings, but not strictly in the field of tax 
compliance.  Fellner et al. (2013) present a field experiment on increasing compliance with television licensing 
amongst Austrian citizens. Bhargava and Manoli (2012) conduct a field experiment with the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service to increase take-up of benefits. There are many existing field experiments that deal with the effect of social 
norm information in wider policy areas, most notably energy consumption (Schultz et al., 2007).  Our research also 
speaks to the literature that suggests that information provided by governments can affect citizen behavior (Chetty & 
Saez, 2009; Kling et al., 2011; Liebman & Luttmer, 2011). 
  3 
Office’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT).2  The experiment focused on those taxpayers who had 
already declared their income to be taxed, but who had not yet paid their tax liabilities.3 We 
randomized five messages across around 100,000 individual taxpayers: three norm-based 
messages and two public services messages.  A control group received a standard letter with no 
persuasive message of this kind. The results show that social norm and public services messages 
increased the likelihood of individuals paying their declared tax liabilities.  The most successful 
moral cost message produced a treatment effect of 5.1% (0.1); this improvement was sustained 
until at least seventy days after the letters were issued.  We find no evidence that a loss-framed 
message referring to public services is more effective than an equivalent gain-framed message. 
We estimate that £4.9 million was accelerated during the 23-day sample period due to the 
messages tested in the first field experiment.     
These results led to a second large-scale natural field experiment (with the same 
government partners) that focused more carefully on message type.  This second experiment 
investigated whether the most effective treatment from Experiment One could be replicated. In 
addition, we compared the effect of descriptive norms (i.e. what others do) and injunctive norms 
(i.e. what others think should be done).  The experiment also interacted descriptive and injunctive 
norms.  Finally, financial messages were included: they gave details of the added interest cost of 
non-payment and the payment vehicles that a person could use.   
We find that descriptive norms have a significantly larger effect than injunctive norms on 
increasing payment rates.  We also replicate the minority norm finding from the first experiment, 
which significantly increases the reliability of our results (Maniadis et al., 2014).  We also find 
improvements from the financial messages (a 3.2-3.9 percentage point increase in payment rates). 
Many of the effects generated by the treatments remained economically meaningful and 
statistically significant seventy days after the letters were issued.  This result suggests that social 
norm messages could have a persistent effect on behavior (see Allcott & Rodgers, 2014).  Overall, 
we estimate that more than £9 million was accelerated during the initial 23 day sample period due 
to these messages.  One should bear in mind that the marginal cost for the policymaker from this 
intervention was very small. 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that the trials presented within this paper would not have happened without the concerted 
efforts of officials within the U.K. Government.  In particular, the authors want to highlight the work of officials in 
HMRC and the BIT, with whom the authors worked to design and implement the trials, and collect the data upon 
which this analysis is based.  Particular acknowledgement should go to Nick Down.   
3 The sample therefore consists of individuals who have exhibited non-compliant behavior. We speculate that these 
are individuals who may be less responsive to social norms around tax compliance (and thus the measured effects are 
lower bounds for a broader sample). 
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Overall, the results show that short messages referring to social norms and public services 
can influence the timing of tax payments.  Many previous studies have concluded that the framing 
of messages does not matter – or, at least, that only sanction-based messages have an effect 
(Blumenthal et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Ariel, 2012; Hallsworth, 2014).  There are many 
possible reasons for this difference (e.g., different countries, samples, timing, and incentives), and 
future research should explore what contexts allow moral costs to operate.   
 The remainder of the study is structured as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief overview of the 
literature that informs the experiments.  Sections 3 and 4 summarize the experimental design and 
results from the first natural field experiment.  Sections 5 and 6 give the design and results for the 
second natural field experiment.  Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  Literature 
 
In the standard model of tax evasion, the taxpayer faces a decision under risk, with the 
extent of evasion chosen to maximize expected utility (Becker, 1968; AS, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974).  
The risk arises from the possibility that the tax authority will discover and punish the individual’s 
evasion. This model has often been used to assess how much income is declared to tax authorities 
(see Alm, 2012), but it is rarely used to understand the decision to pay the declared income.  
Clearly, there are at least two stages to tax compliance.  The first is to decide whether to evade.  
Once that decision is taken, in the second stage the individual decides to pay the declared tax on 
time, pay the declared tax late, or not pay the declared tax.4  Of course, in equilibrium the second 
stage reasoning affects the first stage decision, but we focus exclusively here on the second stage 
to provide a clear link to the natural field experiments.  
 Various studies have proposed that giving information about the prevalence of compliance 
could increase the moral costs of non-compliance (Traxler, 2010; Myles & Naylor 1996; Frey & 
Torgler, 2007).  The main mechanism proposed is that the actors internalize observed social 
norms, so that any deviation is accompanied by self-imposed costs such as feelings of guilt (Elster, 
1989; Wenzel, 2004).  There is some non-field experimental evidence that compliance increases 
after individuals are presented with such norm information (Wenzel, 2005a; Alm et al., 2013; 
Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher, 2013). Many field studies have, however, found no effect of 
providing social norm information; only recently has evidence emerged that social norms can 
affect compliance in real-world settings (Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod, 2001; Slemrod, 2016).   
                                                 
4 Countries such as the US and Canada explicitly refer to payment when defining compliance. See US Treasury 
(2009) and Boame (2008). 
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It is important to distinguish between different types of social norms. Cialdini et al.’s 
(1991) theory of normative conduct identifies ‘descriptive’ norms, which communicate the 
behavior of others, and ‘injunctive’ norms, which communicate the opinions of others.  Put 
differently, descriptive norms say what others do; injunctive norms say what others believe, 
including what behaviors they approve of (see also Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  Experimental 
research has shown that descriptive and injunctive norms have independent effects on behavior, 
strengthening the case for treating them as conceptually distinct (Rivis & Sheeran, 2003).  The 
distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms has rarely been examined in the context of 
tax compliance; we believe that Bobek et al. (2007) and Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher (2013) are 
the only studies to have done so.  
A related concept is that of moral duty.  Rather than moral costs being increased because 
of information that the actor has deviated from the behavior of others, here the costs are generated 
by deviation from a moral standard (Erard & Feinstein, 1994; Reckers et al., 1994; Alm & Torgler 
2011; Calvet Christian & Alm, 2014).  From an empirical perspective, there have been survey-
based (Feld & Larsen, 2012) and experimental (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003) studies that indicate 
beliefs about the morality of compliance can influence tax behavior.  Again, however, other 
studies have shown no significant improvements (Torgler, 2004; Ariel, 2012). 
Finally, we also included public services concerns, as introduced by Cowell and Gordon 
(1988), which allow taxpayers to derive utility from both income and public service provision.  
Most people realize that taxation is necessary to fund public services that benefit everyone, as well 
as specific items from which they gain in particular.  Thus, there are at least two different 
approaches at work.  First, a simple reciprocal mechanism of ‘something for something’, wherein 
tax is paid in order to receive some other kind of benefit (Fehr & Gachter, 1998).  Second, a more 
altruistic perspective wherein paying tax is the means to create goods which everyone can 
potentially use and enjoy (Feld & Frey, 2010).  There is some evidence that the level of benefits 
provided through taxation (and participants’ awareness of these benefits) can influence 
compliance from both surveys (Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976) and experiments (Alm, McClelland & 
Schulze, 1992), but other studies have found no such effects (Torgler, 2004; Blumenthal et al., 
2001). 
Beyond simply introducing these sources of moral cost, we proposed that the way these 
concerns are framed can influence taxpayers’ payment decisions. We focused particularly on the 
framing of social norms.  For norms, one particularly promising approach is to make the norm 
more specific to the individual’s situation or a group to which she belongs.  Wenzel (2005b) has 
provided empirical support for this mechanism, reporting that perceived social norms affected tax 
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compliance only if the respondent identified with the group in question.   
Such framings vary the level of abstraction or ‘psychological distance’ to the norm, as 
elaborated in construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), which has been shown to be 
important in laboratory experimental data.  The theory postulates that we mentally represent, or 
‘construe’, events or behaviors at different levels.  Representations based on ‘high-level’ 
construals are experienced as psychologically distant and consist of a few abstract, 
decontextualized features that are more invariant than ‘low-level’ construals.  In contrast, 
representations based on ‘low-level’ construals are experienced as more psychologically proximal 
– they are more concrete and consist of more contextualized here-and-now details.  We 
hypothesized that reduced psychological distance (and therefore increased salience) would 
increase the moral costs incurred by the message. 
We also tested the framing of public services concerns.  While the discussion above 
focused on the benefits created through payment of tax, it is also possible to foreground the loss of 
benefits through non-payment.  Although non-payment may lead to short-term gain for an 
individual, since such decisions are interdependent it could also contribute to a situation where all 
citizens eventually lose.  Taxpayers could be loss-averse with respect to consumption and tax 
payments, so that events framed as losses are given disproportionate weight at the moment of 
choosing to pay or not (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  There is evidence from other domains that 
this different ‘goal/outcome framing’ can influence behavioral outcomes (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 
1987; Ganzach & Karsahi, 1995; Rothman & Salovey, 1997).  We therefore hypothesized that 
presenting the potential losses from non-payment of taxes will incur greater moral costs than 
presenting the potential gains from payment.     
  
3.  Experiment One: Methodology 
3.1 Research setting 
We collaborated in a natural field experiment on payment of taxes in the UK.  Most 
income tax in the UK is collected by employers at source, through a “Pay As You Earn” system.  
Most individual taxpayers are therefore not required to submit a tax return.  However, a variety of 
circumstances can require an individual to file a Self Assessment tax return, such as self-
employment, multiple sources of income, or trustee status.5  As Kleven et al. (2011) show, those 
who self-report income have the lowest levels of tax compliance.    
Around ten million UK taxpayers participate in the Self Assessment scheme, which 
                                                 
5 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/sa/need-tax-return.htm - clearly this is not the same as withholding tax in the US. 
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requires them to file a return annually. Most participants also have to make two tax payments a 
year – the first by January 31, the second by July 31.  If taxpayers do not pay the correct amount 
by these deadlines, then the tax authority has to pursue the debt.  This process entails sending a 
reminder statement, followed by a combination of targeted letters and telephone calls.  Ultimately, 
the tax authority has the power to enforce payment by seizing and auctioning goods and assets 
(Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2010).  
We incorporated the test messages into the letters sent to Self Assessment taxpayers who 
had not made the correct payment by July 31, 2011.  All taxpayers had a debt of between £400 and 
£100,000 on August 1, 2011.6 We excluded taxpayers with additional outstanding Self 
Assessment debts, since we could not rule out that they would not be receiving additional 
communications relating to their old debts.  Scottish debts are subject to separate legal 
proceedings, and thus were not included. No other exclusion criteria were applied. These 
procedures resulted in a sample of 101,471 individuals geographically distributed across England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland.  
Letters were addressed solely to the individual who incurred the debt, and all were sent in 
standard HMRC envelopes.  It is important to note that, due to administrative policy, letters had to 
be delivered to all agents who had not paid their taxes (including those in the control group).  
Recipients had no way of identifying the other participants, thanks to strict taxpayer 
confidentiality laws, so spillover effects are not a concern.7  The letters themselves did not make 
reference to any experimental variation in wording.  The individuals had not received any 
communications relating to these debts prior to the experimental letters. There were no 
promotional campaigns relating to the payment of tax debts during or prior to the issue of the 
letters. Thus, there is little identifiable risk of the results being contaminated by exogenous factors. 
 
3.2 Experimental Messages 
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.  We begin with a control letter, which has 
the basic HMRC reminder text.  We contrast this baseline with five treatments.  The experimental 
variation in these five treatments was simply the inclusion of a short phrase, in the standard 
typeface, after the first sentence.  These messages were created to test the theories outlined in 
section 2.  These phrases were constructed to persuade the recipient to pay the amount they owe, 
                                                 
6 Debts below £400 and above £100,000 were subject to different actions and hence could not be included in the 
sample. 
7 Technically, it is possible that two taxpayers in a relationship may both incur self-assessment debts and may 
compare reminder letters. We consider the probability of this happening to be very small, and there is no evidence that 
it has happened. 
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and they fall into two main categories: those that refer to social norms, and those relating to the 
provision of public services.  This experiment focused solely on the descriptive aspect of norms, 
and therefore the first message was a simple factual statement: “Nine out of ten people pay their 
tax on time.”  Following the discussion of construal level theory above, this norm message was 
constructed to be as non-specific as possible. This ‘basic norm’ was therefore intended to capture 
a simple information effect aimed at correcting misperceptions.   
The second phrase was identical to the basic norm, but explicitly associated the norm 
behavior with the United Kingdom: “Nine out of ten people in the UK pay their tax on time.”  This 
variation was intended to increase the specificity (and therefore salience) of the norm message. 
Nationality was chosen as source of salience because Wenzel’s (2004, 2005a) studies of 
Australian taxpayers found that levels of identification with Australia interacted with perceived 
norms of tax behavior to increase reported tax compliance. Torgler’s (2007) work on ‘tax morale’ 
has also identified pride in one’s country as an important factor in tax compliance.  We 
hypothesized that sufficient numbers of taxpayers would identify with the UK, and hence find this 
formulation more salient, to produce a significant change in behavior compared to the generic 
norm. 
The third phrase tested the effect of adding an explicit statement that the recipient is 
engaged in a minority behavior. Of course, this is the implicit conclusion of the basic and country 
norm messages, since all the reminder letters state that the recipient has not paid her tax yet. 
However, as Vlaev et al. (2011) show, decisions are made on the basis of even limited and 
superfluous information. The intent, therefore, was to assess the specific framing effect of 
presenting the recipient’s behavior as a minority one.  Again, we hypothesized that explicitly 
connecting the social norm to the recipient’s own behavior would increase the salience of the 
norm message.8  The ‘minority norm’ message read: “Nine out of ten people in the UK pay their 
tax on time. You are currently in the very small minority of people who have not paid us yet.”   
The second strategy attempted to persuade individuals to pay taxes by focusing on the 
outcomes of taxation (i.e. public goods or services). We constructed a message that framed the 
issue of paying tax collectively, while also mentioning specific services that recipients were likely 
to have used themselves: “Paying tax means we all gain from vital public services like the NHS 
[National Health Service], roads, and schools.” As noted above, we are also interested in the 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that this additional statement can be seen as introducing two elements: a) an increased focus on the 
individual as such; b) the placing of that individual in a minority.  In practice, it is difficult to communicate one 
concept without the other, which means we have not attempted to do so in this setting (the task of disentangling the 
two elements presents an opportunity for future laboratory-based research).  It is debatable how substantial the effects 
of the first element are likely to be, since the opening sentence of every letter contains the phrase “Our records show 
your Self Assessment payment is overdue”.  
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effects of framing the concept as a potential loss, so the following wording was introduced: “Not 
paying tax means we all lose out on vital public services like the NHS, roads, and schools.”  As in 
De Martino et al. (2006), the frame changes are limited to the minimum possible change in 
wording, thus limiting confounding factors.9   
Two points relating to the messages should be noted.  First, the control group receives the 
standard letter with basic information on size of debt and how to pay.  Therefore, the main 
experimental treatments simply measure the change in behavior associated with the presence or 
absence of the test phrases. Second, it should be emphasized that any results generated in this trial 
show the effects of specific changes to message wording alone.  Unlike many previous field 
experiments, the treatments were limited to relatively small changes to short phrases, rather than 
extensive changes to wording or a combination of phrases and visual content (cf. Blumenthal et 
al., 2001; see Hasseldine, 2000).  At most, the phrases increase the letter length from 104 words to 
133 words. Any interpretation of the effects should note the relatively modest nature of the 
treatments.  
 
3.3 Sampling and randomization 
The sample of 101,471 individuals was divided into six treatment groups to ensure that the 
study had adequate statistical power, capable of detecting effects roughly equal to a one 
percentage point difference in payment rates.  Cases were subjected to a simple randomization 
process, with no blocking and equal allocation to each group (due to technical constraints). Each 
Self Assessment taxpayer has a unique reference number, which is created by computer-generated 
randomization syntax.10  In order to select cases, the six different messages were assigned to 54 
ranges of these reference numbers.  Ranges were used because the technical ability did not exist to 
allocate taxpayer numbers to messages on a case-by-case basis. Since the taxpayer numbers were 
randomly generated, their contiguity was not considered a risk to randomization.  Due to the fact 
that the letter ranges were inputted each day manually, 54 ranges represented the point at which 
the risk of implementation errors through complexity began to outweigh the marginal benefits.  
                                                 
9 It should be noted that the public service messages refer to “paying tax”, rather than “paying tax on time”, as in the 
norm messages.  To standardise one or the other would cause practical problems.  If the social norm messages were to 
refer to “paying tax” instead, this would complicate the message considerably, since the proportion who pay at all is 
much higher than nine out of ten.  Either the “nine out of ten” message would need to be changed to a percentage, 
which we considered to be less compelling (an assumption that was tested empirically in Experiment Two), or it 
would risk understating compliance.  If the social norm messages were to refer to “paying tax on time”, then the 
message would have to be diluted to something like “not paying tax on time weakens vital public services”, or similar.  
Our judgment was that this was a less compelling and – more importantly – less defensible statement.  
10 Analysis conducted by HMRC revealed no significant correlations between taxpayer reference numbers and 
observable characteristics such as age and gender, which gave us further confidence in this process.  
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The resulting groups were similar in size, total value and mean value of debts, as well as mean 
taxpayer age.  Aggregated figures also showed similar gender allocations across groups (see Table 
1).  
After the trial was conducted, we were able to obtain line-by-line debt data and run 
regressions to establish whether membership of a treatment group was significantly predicted by 
any of these variables (age, gender, and size of debt).  We do observe some imbalance on the debt 
and gender variables, with a high degree of certainty in some instances (see Table A1).  However, 
in the Results section we note that the coefficients do not change significantly with the 
introduction of covariates, and that there is a consistent pattern of results between the two 
experiments.  The robustness of the results to controls gives us confidence in their reliability; the 
imbalances are an example of the inherent challenges of working with existing government 
processes in a live policy environment.  We obtain balance across time with respect to the timing 
of letters received (‘early’ versus ‘late’, as explained below).   
Another consideration in the sampling was that the volume of cases required the letters to 
be issued over five sequential days.  To prevent the day of issue from creating any systemic 
variation, a Latin Squares design was used to ensure that an equal number of reference number 
ranges were allocated to each day (see Table 2).   
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is to examine the effect on tax paying behavior of: (a) the impact of 
reminder letters as such; and (b) messages contained in those letters.  Our dependent variable is 
whether the letter recipient made a payment to the tax authority, according to official tax records. 
As noted previously, letters had to be delivered to all agents who had not paid their taxes, 
including those in the control group. Therefore, to measure the effect of the baseline (reminder) 
letter, we staggered the issue of the letters over five days in August 2011.  Since the date of issue 
was randomized, we can compare the compliance rates of those receiving the earliest letters versus 
the latest letters.  If we do this at a point when the early letters have been received, but the late 
letters have not, we can estimate the effect of a receiving a reminder letter per se. Therefore, we 
compare the payment rates at August 23, 2011 of those who were issued letters on August 16, 
2011 with those who were issued letters on August 22, 2011 (see timeline below).    
 
Date Action 
16th August 2011 (n) EARLY letters sent 
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17th August 2011  
18th August 2011  
19th August 2011 EARLY letters received 
[weekend]  
22nd August 2011 (n) LATE letters sent 
23rd August 2011 Comparison point 
24th August 2011  
25th August 2011 LATE letters received  
 
We make this comparison using the following logit regression: 
i
early
iii LP   18         (4) 
where Pi8 is whether the individual pays their debt in the first eight days (i.e. by August 23, 2011, 
which is before individuals in the ‘late’ group receive their letter), and Liearly is a dummy variable 
that is 1 if the individual is randomized to receive the tax letter in the early period as opposed to 
the late period.  We present the marginal coefficients in the summary results table, where  is the 
impact of being in the group receiving an early letter versus a late letter on tax payment.  
To examine the impact of the messages we run the following logit regression: 
  

Pi2 3   i  1Li
b a sic 2Li
co u n try 3Li
min o rity 4Li
g a in 5Li
lo ss i   (5) 
where Pi23 is whether the individual pays their tax debt in the first 23 days.
11 Li
basic is a dummy 
variable for the basic norm treatment, Li
country is a dummy variable for the country norm treatment, 
Li
minority is a dummy variable for the minority norm treatment, Li
gain is a dummy variable for the 
gain-framed public services treatment, and Li
loss is a dummy variable for the loss-framed public 
services treatment. In the results tables we present marginal effects of the logit regressions.12 We 
also conduct a survival analysis in order to determine whether we obtain similar results using a 
different approach. The survival analysis methodology is summarised in the Appendix. 
 
4   Experiment One: Results 
Table 3 summarizes the impact of early versus late letters, in order to estimate the effect of 
receiving a reminder letter as such.  The first two rows in Table 3 show that the impact of the 
                                                 
11 We measure the letter effects during the first 23 days for the following reason. Given that the test messages were 
only included in the first letter sent by the tax authority, the most accurate point at which to measure their effects is 
immediately before the subsequent reminder letter is received. After factoring in the potential variation in postal 
delivery times, we calculate that the earliest these subsequent letters can arrive is 23 days after issue of the first letter.   
12 We also ran OLS estimates with robust standard errors and find identical coefficients and standard errors. 
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control reminder is around 6.7 percentage points - that is, those receiving a letter were nearly four 
times more likely to pay tax at this point than those who did not receive a letter.13  Subsequent 
rows show the differences for early versus late letters for our five letters with additional messages.  
We find that the reminder letters with the norm framings have a 7.1-7.8 percentage points effect 
on payment.  The public services letters also had an impact on payment, with an effect of between 
5.9 and 7.6 percentage points. When we average across all the groups, we find that the effect of 
the reminder letters is 7.1 percentage points.  This is not a precise estimate of the reminder effect, 
and is probably a lower bound estimate, because we could not observe whether additional 
payments were made after everyone had received a tax letter. 
 
Result 1: Reminder letters accelerate tax payments. 
 
We turn next to the impact of the messages.  Figure 1 plots the percentage of people per 
day who pay in the first 23 days in each of the six treatment groups.  The days for which there is 
no recorded payment are weekends.14  From visual inspection, one can clearly see that differences 
emerge from August 25th 2011.  In fact, most of the treatment groups have higher per day payment 
rates from this date than the control group.   
The regression outputs in Table 4 show that the trial letters significantly increased the 
likelihood of payment occurring.  These results were maintained after data on the taxpayer’s age, 
gender, and size of debt were added to the model as linear covariates.  The average effect for the 
basic norm is 1.3% (0.025) and for the country norm it is 2.1% (0.040).  The effect size for the 
minority norm is much larger, with a payment rate 5.1 percentage points higher than the control 
(0.11).  This minority norm effect is around 70% of the reminder letter effect.  This minority 
norm effect is significantly greater than both the basic norm and the country norm (both p<0.001).  
The country norm is not significantly greater than the basic norm (diff=0.017, p=0.26), which does 
not support the construal level theory outlined in section 2.  Both the gain- and loss-framed public 
services messages had an effect of 1.6% (0.030), which does not support the loss-framing 
hypothesis in section 2.  
Results from the supplementary survival analysis confirmed that there was a significant 
difference in payment rates between the treatment groups and the control for a) the period up to 23 
days; b) the period between 23 days and 48 days; c) the study period as a whole. We do not 
                                                 
13 This is a similar effect size to Fellner et al. (2013) in the case of television license payments. 
14 August 29th 2011 was also a public holiday in the UK, which has clearly affected the payment data. 
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observe a statistically difference between treatment groups and control if the period after 48 days 
is analysed on its own (see Appendix).  
 
Result 2: Letters with social norm messages accelerate tax payments, especially when the 
minority norm frame is used. 
 
Result 3: Letters with public services messages accelerate tax payments. 
 
Result 4: Loss-framed public service messages are not significantly more effective at increasing 
tax payments than gain-framed public service messages. 
 
Thus, we find that all of the test messages have a positive impact on paying tax.  Jointly, 
these five test messages increase payments after 23 days by 2.2 percentage points compared to the 
control message (p<0.000).  In specification (III), we have included day fixed effects for when the 
letter was sent out.  If we find that people are more likely to respond to later letters, then there 
might be a liquidity constraint argument to be made.  Including the day effects makes no 
difference to the treatment coefficients.  It is interesting to observe that the third and fifth days the 
letters were sent out had an increased payment effect of 1.2% and 3.5% (both p<0.01).     
Although the 23 day period is most appropriate to isolate the experimental effects, we can 
extend this period to understand the persistence of these effects, a question that has recently 
attracted attention in other policy areas (see Rogers & Frey, 2014).  Columns (IV) and (V) of 
Table 4 present payment rates at 48 and 70 days respectively.  These periods were selected 
because they represented the points at which subsequent stages of the tax authority’s debt recovery 
process were concluded. To clarify: 23 days represents the last point before the second letter was 
received by taxpayers. A third letter was then issued, arriving at 35-38 days.  48 days represents 
the last point before the debts were sent to a call center, where multiple calls were made to try to 
collect the debt. 70 days represents the last point before the debts were sent for a personal visit 
from an officer with the power to seize personal goods for payment. These results show that the 
country and minority norm messages remain economically meaningful and statistically significant 
at 48 days, and the minority norm message at 70 days (see Figure 2). The results therefore mean 
that more costly and intensive debt collection procedures were avoided.15     
                                                 
15 HMRC were unable to provide us with reliable estimates of the cost of these actions, and we do not believe these 
figures have been made public through other channels.  
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 We interacted the letter treatments with age and gender. None of the interactions were 
significant at the five percent significance level, except that men responded 2.4% more to the loss-
framed message than women, which reflects earlier experimental evidence on framing effects, 
gender and taxation (Hasseldine & Hite, 2003).  In Table 5 we present the results by quartiles of 
debt size, while also isolating those with debts in the top 5% and 1% of the distribution. It appears 
that the effect sizes are relatively similar for these various groups, but it is worth noting that the 
effect of the public services messages appears to be significantly larger for those with larger debts: 
for those in the top 1% of the distribution, the loss-framed public service message increased the 
payment rate by 17.6 percentage points.     
We also examined whether these results occurred because the messages increased the 
recipients’ perceptions of the costs associated with non-compliance.  To do this, we ran a 
subsequent laboratory experiment where participants were randomized to view seven of the 
treatment letters (see Appendix). We measured participants’ responses on five dimensions. The 
first two measures captured the two main elements of the AS model: likelihood of detection and 
severity of punishment; these were complemented by a more general measure of “threat” posed by 
the messages. The final two measures concerned how specific a participant thought the message 
was to them (to address the construal-level hypothesis) and the participant’s self-reported 
likelihood of paying.  
We take the country norm message as our comparison group because, of the seven 
messages, it produced the smallest effect on behavior. We found that there were no significant 
differences between the country norm and other treatment groups in likelihood of payment, 
likelihood of detection, specificity to recipient, or likelihood of payment. The general threat 
perception was significantly higher than the country norm for four of the six other messages: 
minority norm, minority status, local descriptive norm, and local and debt descriptive norm. 
Arguably, this presents weak evidence that increased perception of threat may be a factor 
contributing to these results, although the lack of significant differences in similar measures 
should also be noted.   
We use the estimates from Table 4, Regression (I) to estimate the revenue accelerated from 
the messages in the 23 day period. The minority norm message generated £1.8 million in 
collections that would not have been present at the 23rd day otherwise.16 If this approach had been 
taken on the whole sample, it would have accelerated £10.9 million at this point. If we take the 
                                                 
16 This is calculated by examining the average effect of 3.8% on the minority norm group liabilities. So with 16,515 
individuals in this group with a mean debt value of £2,810.51, a 3.8% increase in payment would be equal to (16,515* 
0.038)*£2,811. 
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other estimates at face value, we calculate that £4.9 million otherwise would not have been paid in 
the experimental period.17 We investigated the possibility of assessing the benefits from the trial 
by calculating the cost savings to HMRC from having to carry out enforcement activities on fewer 
debts, but it was unable to supply us reliable cost estimates. 
 
Result 5: £4.9 million was accelerated in the first 23 days from the test messages.  
 
 
5   Experiment Two: Methodology 
 
5.1 Research setting 
The second natural field experiment had the same setting as Experiment One, but was 
conducted a year later.  The three main objectives of the second experiment were to examine the 
reliability of the minority norm effect, compare the relative effects of descriptive and injunctive 
norms, and assess the impact of including financial information.  Letters were sent to Self 
Assessment taxpayers who had not made the correct payment by July 31, 2012.  All taxpayers had 
a debt of between £351 and £50,000 on August 1, 2012.18  As before, taxpayers with additional 
outstanding Self Assessment debts were excluded, which resulted in the sample containing 
119,527 individuals from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
 
5.2 Sampling and randomization 
The sample of 119,527 individuals was split into fourteen groups, resulting in a mean 
sample size of 8,538.  While increasing the number of groups limited our ability to detect 
differences of less than two percentage points, it allowed more sophisticated comparisons between 
norm effects. As before, technical limitations meant we were unable to block cases in advance of 
the letters being issued.  We retained the system of using taxpayer unique reference numbers as 
the units of randomization, but developed the procedure further.  We identified 84 ranges of 
taxpayer reference numbers, reflecting the fourteen groups of letters that were to be issued over 
six days.  We then used computer-based randomization to allocate these ranges to one of the 
treatment groups and to a particular day of issue. The resulting treatment groups were similar in 
size, total value, mean value of debts, mean taxpayer age, and gender distributions (Table 6).    
                                                 
17 We discuss the welfare implications of these results in the Discussion. 
18 The value ranges therefore differ from the first experiment.  This is owing to developments in the tax authority’s 
procedures.  Given the distribution of values, the impact of these changes on the size of our sample is relatively small. 
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Again, we ran a logistic regression to investigate whether membership of a particular 
group is significantly determined by these variables.  When accounting for age, gender, size of 
debt, and use of an accountant, across our fourteen groups we found that in three of the 52 
comparisons balance was a significant factor at the 0.05 significance level.  The fraction injunctive 
norm and general descriptive norm groups were less likely to be male, and the minority status 
group were less likely to use an accountant.  
As with Experiment One, letters were issued over sequential business days, although in 
this experiment six days were required to issue the letters.  Rather than a Latin Squares design, we 
used the additional randomization step described above to allocate cases to be issued letters across 
the six days of the experiment (see Table 7).   
 
5.3 Messages 
As with Experiment One, letters were sent to all taxpayers in the sample.  Letters similarly 
contained basic information about the size of debt and means of payment, but this information was 
shorter than in the previous experiment.  Again, the experimental variation was the inclusion of a 
short phrase after the first sentence, this time in bold typeface.  All other aspects of the treatments 
remain identical. 
The thirteen messages in the second natural field experiment can be divided into three 
groups.  First, six social norm messages that represented varying levels of psychological distance, 
including a replication of the minority norm message from Experiment One.  Second, five 
messages constructed to measure the impact of injunctive, rather than descriptive, social norms 
(Cialdini et al., 1991).  Third, two ‘financial information’ messages specifically related to the 
payment decision, namely the inclusion of additional payment information and a warning of 
interest charges.      
The first group of messages varied psychological distance by making the norm more 
specific in two respects: in terms of geography, and in terms of the tax debt.  An adapted form of 
the country norm message from Experiment One was used as a general descriptive norm message 
(“The great majority of people in the UK pay their tax on time”).19 In a second message, the 
mention of the country was replaced with a reference to the recipient’s local area, thereby 
increasing geographic specificity (“The great majority of people in your local area pay their tax 
                                                 
19 We adapted the country norm, rather than the basic norm, on the basis that it was more likely to produce a 
significant difference from the control condition.  This was a relevant point, given the reduced power of Experiment 
Two compared to Experiment One. The general descriptive norm is very similar to the country norm message in 
Experiment One, except that it states ‘the great majority’, rather than ‘nine out of ten’.  This is because it could not be 
guaranteed that the 90% payment rate occurred in every local area in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (as stated 
in the local descriptive norm message), and therefore such a statement could prove incorrect if questioned.      
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on time”). Debt specificity was increased by a third message, which indicated the social norm for 
those with similar debts (“Most people with a debt like yours have paid it by now”).  
A fourth message combined the preceding two messages (“The great majority of people in 
your local area pay their tax on time. Most people with a debt like yours have paid it by now.”) As 
with the movement from basic to country norm in Experiment One, these messages were intended 
to examine the effect of making a norm increasingly specific to a recipient.  Geography and type 
of debt were identified as two dimensions that produced messages that remained applicable, 
accurate, and acceptable to recipients, even as specificity increased.  
As noted above, we also included the message that produced the largest effect in 
Experiment One, namely the minority norm (“Nine out of ten people in the UK pay their tax on 
time. You are currently in the very small minority of people who have not paid us yet”).  We 
hypothesized that this effect would be replicated in Experiment Two. However, Experiment One 
did not include the minority phrase – the second half of the message – as a separate message.  We 
therefore did so in Experiment Two, in order to assess the specific effect of referring to minority 
status (“You are currently in the very small minority of people who have not paid us yet”).  
The second group of messages were constructed to assess the effect of messages based on 
injunctive norms.  Experiment One showed that descriptive norm statements increased tax 
payments, raising the question of whether injunctive norm statements about attitudes towards 
taxpaying could have similar effects.  Given existing evidence, we hypothesized that the injunctive 
and descriptive norms would have a significantly different effect on behavior – although we did 
not propose a direction for this difference.     
Government communications must be proportionate and accurate (and we were careful that 
our messages were true, accurate, and avoided any deception).  Therefore, in order to use an 
injunctive norm statement, reliable evidence of others’ attitudes towards non-payment of tax was 
required. We were able to ensure that a survey of 1,207 UK adults which took place in May 2012 
measured the extent to which respondents agreed with the statement ‘Everyone in the UK should 
pay their tax on time’ (88% of respondents agreed).20  We include this statement as a separate 
message in Experiment Two in order to operationalise the moral duty concept outlined in section 
2.  
The remaining messages in this group were constructed to isolate the additional effect of 
representing this moral duty as an injunctive norm. As outlined in section 2, the most basic 
                                                 
20 This was an omnibus survey conducted by TNS BMRB, who kindly allowed us to include this question. A five-
point Likert scale was used to measure agreement. A summary of some of the results can be found at 
http://www.kantar.com/public-opinion/policy/180712-attitudes-to-tax-avoidance/ 
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formulation introduces a general injunctive norm using phrasing similar to the general descriptive 
norm above: “The great majority of people agree that everyone in the UK should pay their tax on 
time”.21  Rather than framing the injunctive norm as being supported by a ‘great majority’ of 
people, the exact result was presented in percentage terms (“88% of people agree that everyone in 
the UK should pay their tax on time”) and as a fraction (“Nine out of ten people agree that 
everyone in the UK should pay their tax on time”).  The final message in this group combined 
descriptive and injunctive norms: “Nine out of ten people agree that everyone in the UK should 
pay their tax on time. And nine out of ten people do pay on time.”   
The third group of messages concerned two other components of the payment decision.  
First, we wished to investigate the effect of providing additional information about methods 
available for paying the tax debt.  Tax researchers have increasingly argued that tax authorities 
should consider a more ‘service oriented’ approach in order to increase tax compliance (Alm & 
Torgler, 2011; Wenzel, 2006).  Such an approach would focus on enabling compliance to be 
achieved more easily through the provision of information and support.  We therefore included 
text that emphasized the choice of means to pay, and that there was an opportunity to discuss the 
debt: “You can pay by debit card, credit card, or Direct Debit. You can also pay using internet 
and telephone banking. For more information on how to pay, go to www.hmrc.gov.uk/payinghmrc. 
If you don’t believe that this payment is overdue, please contact us on the number above.”  
Interestingly, two previous studies that tested similar ‘enabling’ messages found that they had no 
significant effect on compliance (Coleman, 1996; Hasseldine et al., 2007).  Second, we included a 
warning that interest was being charged on the debt, in order to introduce an additional salient cost 
to the payment decision: “We are charging you interest on this amount.”22  We hypothesized that 
both these pieces of financial information would increase payment rates. All messages are 
summarized in Table 6.  
   
6.   Results for Experiment Two 
As for Experiment One, we examine the effect of receiving a letter per se on payment 
rates.  To do so, we create two groups – those who were randomized to be sent letters early (on 
August 10, 2012) and those who were sent letters late (on August 17, 2012).  This is the same 
                                                 
21 Ideally, we would have constructed messages that increase the specificity of this general injunctive norm by making 
the norm’s source more similar to the recipient (for example, ‘people in your local area agree...’).  However, the 
survey data were not detailed enough to support such statements.  As an alternative, we increased the specificity with 
which the level of support for the norm was presented in the messages.  
22 The letters did not state the specific interest rate, which was 3.0% during the period both experiments were 
conducted: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/interest-late-pay.htm 
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procedure as for Experiment One. When examining payment in the first nine days, we observe that 
11.8% of the 21,985 from the early letter group pay. Data capture issues mean that we do not have 
a reliable record of early payment in the second experiment, so we use the 2.5% baseline payment 
rate from the first experiment. On this basis, we observe a highly significant difference between 
groups (9.3%, p<0.001).   
As for the first experiment, we analyzed whether a payment had occurred in the first 23 
days.  To do this, we used the same logit model presented in (5), apart from the fact that we 
include 13 dummy variables, rather than only five.  We also include two new covariates – 
‘accountant’ and ‘experienced’.  The former represents whether the tax form was filed by an 
accountant or not, and the latter is whether the individual had been late paying his or her tax in 
either of the previous two tax years.  We were not able to access these two variables for the first 
experiment.  Including these two variables does not affect the treatment group coefficients, but we 
include them for completeness and transparency.  
The trial letters significantly increased the likelihood of payment occurring in the first 23 
days.  As Table 8 shows, these results were maintained after data on the taxpayer’s age, gender, 
and size of debt were added to the model.  We also include whether they used an accountant or 
were late payers in the past.  From regressions (I) and (II), it is clear that the estimates do not 
change. The pooled effect of the thirteen test messages was to increase payments after 23 days by 
2.9 percentage points compared to the control message (p<0.000).   
There are multiple comparisons that could be made, given the number of treatment groups 
we have in the second experiment.  As the section above shows, the three main hypotheses in this 
second experiment were: the minority norm effect would be replicated; there would be a 
significantly different effect of descriptive and injunctive norms; and providing financial 
information would increase payment rates. Therefore, we focus on making these comparisons, and 
use a Bonferroni-adjustment while doing so.  We also use the multiple hypotheses testing method 
proposed by List et al. (2016). 
Regression (I) shows that the general injunctive norm is not particularly effective in 
increasing the likelihood of paying tax.  The moral duty frame has a 2.2% effect, and the fraction 
injunctive norm has a 1.7% effect.  We find that the percentage injunctive norm increases payment 
by 3.4% (0.07), which is significantly different from the fraction injunctive norm (diff=0.017, 
p=0.02).  This is interesting for many reasons, since the information was the same but one was 
presented as a percentage and one as a fraction.  One possible explanation is that greater message 
specificity gave the impression of greater message credibility or created a large number effect. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that presenting the moral duty statement as an injunctive norm did not 
significantly affect its impact (remember that the phrases were identical apart from the norm 
framing).   
We next focus on the descriptive norms.  The general descriptive norm increases payment 
by 1.4% and the local descriptive norm increases payment by 2.2%.  The difference between these 
two effects is not significant, and we do not find support for construal level theory in these 
particular messages.  The debt descriptive norm increases payment by 3%, and the local and debt 
descriptive norm has a 5.0% effect (0.11).  This 5.0% effect is just over half the size of the 9.3% 
reminder letter effect mentioned above, and represents a 14.8% relative increase in payment rates.  
It seems that there is an additive effect of the local descriptive norm and the debt descriptive norm, 
since the local and debt descriptive norm is significantly different from both the local descriptive 
norm and the debt descriptive norm (both p<0.01).   
Next we focus on the minority framing, which includes a minority status and a minority 
descriptive norm. These messages increase payments by 4.7% and 4.2%, respectively; both of 
these effects are significantly larger than the general descriptive norm, but are not different from 
the local norm effect.  This result is important because it replicates the effect size from Experiment 
One, thus supporting one of the three main hypotheses in this second experiment.  When we adjust 
the p-values accordingly to account for the three hypotheses, we still find that the effect of the 
minority descriptive norm is significant at the five per cent level (p<0.001).    
We next analyze the second hypothesis; that is, the impact of descriptive norms versus 
injunctive norms.  We group the treatment groups into three bundles: (i) descriptive; (ii) 
injunctive; and (iii) other.  We compare descriptive and injunctive only, and we find that the 
descriptive treatment group has a 1.44% (p<0.000) larger effect on payment than injunctive 
norms.  So we can argue with some precision that descriptive norms produce a larger effect on tax 
payments than injunctive norms.     
We next analyze the two non-norm based messages. We find that telling people that they 
are being charged interest daily had a 3.9% effect (p<0.001), and providing more information on 
how to pay their tax increased payment by 3.2% (p<0.001) (both p-values corrected for multiple 
comparisons); the latter is significantly lower than the local and debt descriptive norm (p=0.01, 
uncorrected).  
 
Result 6: We replicate the results of the first experiment and demonstrate the reliability of norm 
messages. 
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Result 7: Both injunctive and descriptive norm messages change taxpaying behavior, but 
descriptive norms have a larger impact than injunctive norms.  
 
Result 8: Providing financial information increases tax payments.  
 
Regression (II) includes five background variables for each individual in the dataset.  The 
coefficients on age, gender, and initial debt all go in the same direction as Experiment One, with 
very similar magnitudes.  It is clear that people who have an accountant are more likely to pay 
within the 21 days, and those who have been late in the past are also likely to be late in paying 
their taxes in this experiment.23  We then examined if the effectiveness of text messages varied 
according to whether the recipient had previously been late with their tax (and thus will have 
received a reminder letter in the past).  Regression (III) shows the results for those taxpayers who 
had been late in either of the preceding two tax years, and regression (IV) gives the results for 
those who were not late.  The effects are clearly larger for those without a recent debt, although 
three of the messages still created significant (p<0.05) improvements amongst those who had been 
paid late recently (local and debt descriptive norm, minority status, injunctive and descriptive 
norm).   
As for Experiment One, we present the results by quartiles of debt size (Table 9). Again, 
we do not observe any clear patterns by debt quartile. We also analyse the message effects over a 
longer period (Table 10).  Regression (I) gives the results after 42 days, and Regression (II) after 
70 days.  What is clear across these two regressions is that the majority of message effects remain 
economically meaningful and statistically significant 70 days after the initial letter was issued.  
This result shows the persistence of these messages on people’s future behavior, although we see a 
clear decrease in the size of the coefficients.   
Regression (III) considers a different outcome variable: the impact of the messages on the 
number of days until payment occurs. Since this is a continuous variable, we have applied an OLS 
regression for this analysis. As the table shows, there a few messages that move payment dates by 
two days.  For instance, the percentage injunctive norm makes people pay two days earlier, local 
and debt descriptive norm and minority status make people pay 2.8 days earlier, and the minority 
descriptive norm makes people pay 2.2 days earlier.  It is interesting to compare these results with 
                                                 
23 Note that these letters went directly to individual taxpayers, rather than accountants. We have not presented 
interactions between the treatment effects and the covariates because of the large number of treatments in this 
experiment.  
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the observable characteristics of the recipients.  For instance, each extra year of age brings 
payment forward by 0.26 days, males pay 2.4 days later, each extra pound of initial debt postpones 
payment by 0.0002 days, having an accountant advances payment by 2.4 days, and those who 
have recently been late in paying their taxes are likely to wait 21 days longer than those who have 
not.      
Finally, we can calculate the accelerated revenue in the first 23 days by taking the 
coefficient for each message and multiplying it by the number of people in each treatment group, 
then multiplying that by the average debt.  These amounts sum to nearly £9.3 million of 
accelerated revenue over the 23 day period. When considering these sums, it should be noted that 
the costs of this intervention were very low. 
 
Result 9: Framing led to nearly £9.3m in accelerated revenue in the first 23 days, which 
outperformed the first experiment.  
 
7.   Discussion 
The current study adds to the field in the following ways: it allows precise, rather than 
estimated, measurements of non-compliance; it adds to the very limited evidence base on the 
problem of tax non-payment; it has sufficient power to compare the behavioral effects of a variety 
of messages; and it was integrated into the existing business processes of a large economy’s tax 
collection authority. Looking at the similar field experiments surveyed by Hallsworth (2014), it 
appears that the sample size and external validity represent the main advantages of this study; 
however, other field experiments can draw on richer datasets and have the ability to test a wider 
range of interventions (for example, different enforcement mechanisms). Fellner et al. (2013) 
offers a particularly relevant comparison. Although the experimental setting has some differences 
– since it concerns non-payment of television licences in Austria – there are many similarities. As 
noted above, the effect size that Fellner et al. (2013) find for the mere receipt of a letter is very 
similar to the one obtained in our study. In contrast to our study, morality and norm treatments did 
not produce a significant result.24  
Our results suggest that there is value in adopting an approach that incorporates moral 
costs into taxpayer communication.  These costs can be increased by presenting messages relating 
to social norms (both injunctive and descriptive), public services and moral duty. In particular, we 
                                                 
24 Similar to our results in Table 8, columns III and IV, Fellner et al. could also draw on more detailed data to show 
that baseline levels of compliance affected message effectiveness: in high evasion areas, there was evidence of a 
positive effect of norm information and a negative effect of a moral duty message.      
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isolate the minority status frame (which explicitly presents the recipient’s current behavior as a 
minority activity) as significantly increasing the perception of benefits of conforming to the 
norm.25  We also show that increasing the salience of a penalty is effective. Finally, we replicate 
the main findings in a second field experiment, which suggests we are not just dealing with the 
effects of novelty.  In total, this evidence suggests that the framing of information influences tax 
behavior – with effects sustained 70 days after the intervention. 
As noted, many other studies have found that presenting persuasive messages does not 
increase real-world tax compliance.  Three main explanations for this discrepancy suggest 
themselves: (i) the messages in other trial were not effective at changing behavior, even though 
other messages based on the same concepts may be; (ii) decisions related to declaring tax are 
substantially different from those based on paying tax; (iii) other differences in institutional 
contexts and research designs account for the contrasting conclusions. The second explanation 
points towards the need for more theoretical and empirical work on tax payment rather than tax 
declaration.  Recent field experiments are just starting to address this need.  
Two limitations of these studies are worth highlighting.  First, although the participants for 
this study were drawn from the full UK Self Assessment population in 2011 and 2012, they 
constitute those taxpayers who had deliberately or mistakenly failed to pay their outstanding tax 
debts.  They may, therefore, not be representative of the taxpayer population as a whole.  
However, there are good reasons to think that non-compliant taxpayers are less likely to respond 
to norms messages than the population as a whole, since they may have lower tax morale than the 
general population.  Indeed, we note that the social norm effects were stronger for the subset of 
our group who had not had a recent debt prior to Experiment Two. Here we can point to the 
contribution of Dwenger et al. (2016), who propose a conceptual framework that incorporates 
heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation to account for differences in responses by agents to 
compliance initiatives; this study also found that the offer of social recognition for tax compliance 
increases payments by the intrinsically motivated (baseline compliers), while reducing them for 
the extrinsically motivated.    
Second, it is not clear the extent to which these interventions produced new revenue, as 
opposed to accelerated revenue (since there was not a ‘no intervention’ control group). It is worth 
noting that accelerating revenue brings benefits itself.  In addition to suffering increased 
borrowing costs, governments have to employ staff to manage and collect debt, which has 
                                                 
25 A caveat is needed here: as researchers in other fields have remarked, there are difficulties in identifying what 
precise aspect of a message is producing a particular effect – tone, vocabulary, length, and so on (Jackson 1992). 
However, we have been careful to control for these factors wherever possible (partly by keeping the messages short), 
and certainly to a greater extent than most previous studies in this field. 
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potentially large opportunity costs.  These employees also have to collect any penalties or interest 
imposed on the debt, in addition to the debt itself.  It is not the case, therefore, that late payments 
are good for overall welfare.  We do not quantify these benefits because to do so would be 
extremely complex, involve multiple assumptions, and require data that have not been made 
public by the authorities.  Instead, we focus on the data at hand (increased payments at 23 days) 
and are careful to present these benefits as accelerated revenue. 
The results of this study have policy implications.  The collection of taxation is a crucial 
function for governments worldwide and any interventions shown to reduce non-compliance are 
clearly valuable in their own right, particularly if they are very low cost to implement.  Indeed, our 
approach has been adopted more widely in the tax authority (Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, 2013).  Future research should address the extent to which these moral concerns can 
influence behavior in other policy areas. 
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Figure 1: Raw data on the cumulative percentage of people paying per day by treatment 
group for the first 23 days of the study period, Experiment One 
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Figure 2: Raw data on the cumulative percentage of people paying per day by treatment 
group for the first 70 days of the study period, Experiment One 
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Figure 3: Raw data on the cumulative percentage of people paying per day by treatment 
group for the first 23 days of the study period, Experiment Two 
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Figure 4: Raw data on the cumulative percentage of people paying per day by treatment 
group for the first 70 days of the study period, Experiment Two 
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Table 1: Background characteristics of treatment groups - Experiment One 
 
Group name Test phrase N Debt value Mean debt 
value 
Mean Age % 
Male 
0. Control  
17,038 £49,555,210 £2,908.51 49.33 73.61 
1. Basic norm Nine out of ten people pay 
their tax on time. 
17,026 £47,923,291 £2,814.71 49.38 
 
73.53 
 
2. Country norm Nine out of ten people in 
the UK pay their tax on 
time.  
16,926 £46,688,514 £2,758.39 49.37 
 
73.31 
 
3. Minority norm Nine out of ten people in 
the UK pay their tax on 
time. You are currently in 
the very small minority of 
people who have not paid 
us yet. 
16,515 £46,415,638 £2,810.51 49.52 
 
72.96 
 
4. Gain-framed 
public services 
Paying tax means we all 
gain from vital public 
services like the NHS, 
roads, and schools. 
16,807 £47,640,777 
 
£2,834.59 49.37 75.00 
 
5. Loss-framed 
public services 
Not paying tax means we 
all lose out on vital public 
services like the NHS, 
roads, and schools. 
17,159 £48,875,216 £2,848.38 49.37 
 
75.26 
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Table 2: Date of letter issue by treatment group - Experiment One 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Impact of the reminder letter on payment rates – Experiment One 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Early letters were sent on August 16, 2011, and late letters were sent on August 22, 2011. Unclustered robust 
standard errors used for this and all subsequent tables. These results are robust to the multiple hypothesis corrections 
of List et al. (2016). 
 
 
Group name Day of issue Total issue 
   Tue August 
16th 
Wed August 
17th 
Thu August 
18th 
Fri August 
19th 
Mon August 
22nd 
 
1. Control 4,916 3,226 2,909 3,060 2,927 17,038 
2. Basic norm 4,695 3,277 3,022 2,990 3,042 17,026 
3. Country norm 4,358 3,062 3,182 3,212 3,112 16,926 
4. Minority norm 4,714 2,973 2,996 3,201 2,631 16,515 
5. Gain-framed public 
services 
4,611 2,922 3,154 2,926 3,194 16,807 
6. Loss-framed public 
services 
4,843 2,992 3,223 3,097 3,004 17,159 
Type of letter % paid in first eight days S.D. N 
Control early letter 0.092 0.290 4,916 
Control late letter 0.025 0.157 2,927 
Difference 0.067*** 
(0.006) 
  
Basic norm early letter 0.099 0.299 4,695 
Basic norm late letter 0.021 0.142 3,042 
Difference 0.078*** 
(0.006) 
  
Country norm early letter 0.095 0.293 4,358 
Country norm late letter 0.024 0.153 2,112 
Difference 0.071*** 
(0.006) 
  
Minority norm early letter 0.101 0.302 4,714 
Minority norm late letter 0.024 0.153 2,631 
Difference 0.078*** 
(0.006) 
  
Gain-public early letter 0.090 0.286 4,611 
Gain-public late letter 0.031 0.173 3,194 
Difference 0.059*** 
(0.006) 
  
Loss-public early letter 0.098 0.298 4,843 
Loss-public late letter 0.022 0.148 3,004 
Difference 0.076*** 
(0.006) 
  
All letters early letter 0.096 0.295 28,137 
All letters late letter 0.025 0.155 17,910 
Difference 0.071*** 
(0.002) 
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Table 4: Logistic regression on paying tax - Experiment One (marginal effects presented) 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
 Pay tax Pay tax Pay tax 
 
Pay tax 
after 48 days 
Pay tax  
after 70 days 
Basic norm 0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Country norm 0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
Minority norm 0.038*** 
(0.005) 
0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.038*** 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
Gain-framed 
public services 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Loss-framed 
public services 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Age  0.005*** 
(0.0001) 
   
Male  -0.073*** 
(0.004) 
   
Debt size  2.24e-06*** 
(0.000) 
   
Day 2   0.003 
(0.005) 
  
Day 3   0.012*** 
(0.005) 
  
Day 4   -0.009* 
(0.005) 
  
Day 5   0.035*** 
(0.005) 
  
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Baseline 0.358 0.358 0.358 0.706 0.801 
N 98,748 96,354 98,748 96,354 96,354 
Notes: Our dependent variable is whether the individual started to pay or paid in full their outstanding tax 
within the 23 day period. The sample sizes are different in I vs II because data on age or gender is not available 
for every individual. The joint effect of the five treatments was to increase payments after 23 days by 2.2 
percentage points compared to the control message (p<0.000).  
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Table 5: Logistic regression on paying tax - Experiment One (marginal effects presented) – split by initial debt owed 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (IV) (IV) 
 Pay tax – bottom 
quartile 
Pay tax – second 
quartile 
Pay tax – third 
quartile 
 
Pay tax – top 
quartile 
 
Pay tax – top 5% 
 
Pay tax – top 1% 
 
Basic norm 0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.029 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(0.054) 
Country norm 0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.025) 
0.013 
(0.056) 
Minority norm 0.047*** 
(0.011) 
0.064*** 
(0.006) 
0.054*** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.038 
(0.026) 
0.044 
(0.057) 
Gain-framed public 
services 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.025) 
0.084 
(0.054) 
Loss-framed public 
services 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.176*** 
(0.051) 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Baseline 0.378 0.329 0.346 0.378 0.424 0.393 
N 24,342 24,490 24,428 24,275 4,883 967 
Notes: Our dependent variable is whether the individual started to pay or paid in full their outstanding tax within the 23 day period.  
 
  40 
Table 6: Background characteristics of treatment groups - Experiment Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group name Test phrase N Debt value Mean 
debt 
value 
Mean 
Age 
% 
Male 
6. Control  8,558 £23,677,821 £2,766.75 50.51 71.91 
7. General descriptive 
norm 
The great majority of people in the UK pay 
their tax on time. 
8,300 £22,984,178 £2,769.18 50.21 70.40 
8. Local descriptive 
norm 
The great majority of people in your local 
area pay their tax on time. 
8,403 £23,592,768 £2,807.66 50.34 71.40 
9. Debt descriptive norm Most people with a debt like yours have 
paid it by now. 
8,779 £24,836,091 £2,829.03 50.23 71.92 
10. Local and debt 
descriptive norm 
The great majority of people in your local 
area pay their tax on time. Most people 
with a debt like yours have paid it by now. 
8,643 £23,563,039 £2,726.26 50.52 70.99 
11. Minority status You are currently in the very small 
minority of people who have not paid us 
yet. 
8,587 £22,858,435 £2,661.98 50.38 70.68 
12. Minority descriptive 
norm 
Nine out of ten people in the UK pay their 
tax on time. You are currently in the very 
small minority of people who have not paid 
us yet. 
8,731 £24,730,886 £2,832.54 50.44 71.72 
13. Moral duty Everyone in the UK should pay their tax on 
time. 
8,507 £23,360,855 £2,746.07 50.61 71.22 
14. General injunctive 
norm 
The great majority of people agree that 
everyone in the UK should pay their tax on 
time. 
8,595 £24,032,463 £2,796.10 50.40 71.46 
15. Fraction injunctive 
norm 
Nine out of ten people agree that everyone 
in the UK should pay their tax on time. 
8,490 £22,526,004 £2,653.24 50.53 70.39 
16. Percentage injunctive 
norm 
88% of people agree that everyone in the 
UK should pay their tax on time. 
8,428 £23,443,901 £2,781.67 50.47 71.18 
17. Injunctive and 
descriptive norm 
Nine out of ten people agree that everyone 
in the UK should pay their tax on time. And 
nine out of ten people do pay on time. 
8,524 £24,175,451 £2,836.16 50.42 71.00 
18. Additional information You can pay by debit card, credit card, or 
Direct Debit. You can also pay using 
internet and telephone banking. For more 
information on how to pay, go to 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/payinghmrc. If you 
don’t believe that this payment is overdue, 
please contact us on the number above. 
8,499 £23,996,925 £2,823.50 50.27 71.16 
19. Interest We are charging you interest on this 
amount. 
8,483 £23,918,198 £2,819.54 50.25 70.86 
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Table 7: Date of letter issue by treatment group - Experiment Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group name Day of issue Total issue 
  Fri August 
10th 2012 
Mon August 
13th 2012 
Tue August 
14th 2012 
Wed August 
15th 2012 
Thu August 
16th 2012 
Fri August 
17th 2012 
 
20. Control 1,741 1,579 1,565 1,241 1,203 1,229 8,558 
21. General descriptive 
norm 
1,602 1,466 1,433 1,274 1,257 1,268 8,300 
22. Local descriptive 
norm 
1,471 1,532 1,282 1,400 1,356 1,362 8,403 
23. Debt descriptive 
norm 
1,566 1,477 1,607 1,470 1,299 1,360 8,779 
24. Local and debt 
descriptive norm 
1,584 1,464 1,447 1,505 1,270 1,373 8,643 
25. Minority status 1,427 1,578 1,521 1,386 1,328 1,347 8,587 
26. Minority descriptive 
norm 
1,494 1,729 1,361 1,459 1,386 1,302 8,731 
27. Moral duty 1,501 1,353 1,574 1,392 1,391 1,296 8,507 
28. General injunctive 
norm 
1,490 1,436 1,580 1,382 1,346 1,361 8,595 
29. Fraction injunctive 
norm 
1,458 1,431 1,512 1,352 1,335 1,402 8,490 
30. Percentage 
injunctive norm 
1,544 1,666 1,375 1,333 1,268 1,242 8,428 
31. Injunctive and 
descriptive norm 
1,847 1,327 1,273 1,261 1,546 1,270 8,524 
32. Additional 
information 
1,557 1,691 1,377 1,524 1,268 1,082 8,499 
33. Interest  1,703 1,564 1,329 1,441 1,269 1,177 8,483 
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Table 8: Logistic regression on paying tax - Experiment Two (marginal effects presented) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 
Pay tax – Full 
sample 
Pay tax – 
Full sample 
Pay tax – 
recent 
debtors 
Pay tax – no 
recent debt 
     
General descriptive norm 0.014* 0.015* 0.004 0.026** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Local descriptive norm 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.014 0.028** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Debt descriptive norm 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.006 0.064*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Local and debt descriptive norm  0.050*** 0.054*** 0.040*** 0.064*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.012 
Minority status 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.029** 0.072*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Minority descriptive norm 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.014 0.074*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.011 
Moral duty 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.011 0.036*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
General injunctive norm 0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.016 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Fraction injunctive norm 0.017** 0.016** 0.010 0.021* 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Percentage injunctive norm 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.007 0.056*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Injunctive and descriptive norm 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.021** 0.050*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Additional information 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.013 0.052*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Interest 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.013 0.069*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 
Age  0.004***   
  0.000   
Male  -0.030***   
  0.003   
Initial debt  0.00001***   
  0.000   
Accountant  0.027***   
  0.004   
Experienced  -0.219***   
  0.003   
Baseline 0.336 0.336 0.256 0.442 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 119,522 116,148 67,652 51,878 
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Notes: Our dependent variable is whether the individual started to pay or paid in full their outstanding tax 
within the 23 day period. The joint effect of the thirteen treatments was to increase payments after 23 days by 
2.9 percentage points compared to the control message (p<0.000). 
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Table 9: Logistic regression on paying tax - Experiment Two (marginal effects 
presented) – split by initial debt owed 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
 
Pay tax – 
bottom 
quartile 
Pay tax – 
second 
quartile 
Pay tax – 
third 
quartile 
 
Pay tax – 
top quartile 
 
Pay tax – 
top 5% 
 
Pay tax – 
top 1% 
 
       
General descriptive norm 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.007 0.032 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.034) 
Local descriptive norm 0.025 0.024 0.032** 0.005 0.014 0.014 
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Notes: Our dependent variable is whether the individual started to pay or paid in full their outstanding tax 
within the 23 day period.  
  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) 
Debt descriptive norm 0.050*** 0.022 0.032** 0.016 0.025 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) 
Local and debt descriptive 
norm  0.061*** 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.040 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.034) 
Minority status 0.082*** 0.042*** 0.027* 0.038** 0.034 0.028 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.035) 
Minority descriptive norm 0.064*** 0.053*** 0.028* 0.024 0.031 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) 
Moral duty 0.037** 0.027* 0.000 0.026* 0.050** 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.034) 
General injunctive norm 0.017 -0.001 -0.009 0.018 0.038 0.052 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.034) 
Fraction injunctive norm 0.037** 0.011 0.004 0.016 0.016 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.033) 
Percentage injunctive norm 0.048*** 0.028* 0.017 0.042*** 0.033 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) 
Injunctive and descriptive 
norm 0.057*** 0.027* 0.040*** 0.018 0.029 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) 
Additional information 0.029* 0.047*** 0.031** 0.021 0.013 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) 
Interest 0.053*** 0.061* 0.008 0.036** 0.062*** 0.076** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.034) 
Baseline 0.307 0.322 0.350 0.365 0.367 0.314 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
N 29,881 29,880 29,887 29,874 5,869 1,075 
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Table 10: Logistic and OLS regressions on paying tax and timing of tax payments - 
Experiment Two  
 (I) (II) (III) 
 
Pay tax 
in 42 days 
Pay tax 
in 70 days 
Number of days 
late paying tax 
    
General descriptive norm 0.009 0.003 -0.538 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.604 
Local descriptive norm 0.010 0.011 -1.136* 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.600 
Debt descriptive norm 0.013* 0.001 -0.780 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.596 
Local and debt descriptive norm  0.035*** 0.024*** -2.774*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.595 
Minority status 0.034*** 0.027*** -2.808*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.596 
Minority descriptive norm 0.023*** 0.020*** -2.185*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.592 
Moral duty 0.021*** 0.019* -1.823*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.595 
General injunctive norm -0.0001 0.008 -0.431 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.595 
Fraction injunctive norm 0.014* 0.018** -1.513** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.596 
Percentage injunctive norm 0.022*** 0.023*** -1.997*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.595 
Injunctive and descriptive norm 0.023*** 0.012* -1.540*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.599 
Additional information 0.021*** 0.014* -1.882*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.598 
Interest 0.015* 0.006 -1.359** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 0.600 
Age   -0.257*** 
   0.009 
Male   2.384*** 
   0.252 
Initial debt   0.0002*** 
   0.000 
Accountant   -2.444*** 
   0.309 
Experienced   20.829*** 
   0.224 
Baseline 0.509 0.644  
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.08 
N 116,148 116,148 116,156 
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Appendix 
Letters 
Figure A1: Example of the control letter in Experiment One 
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Figure A2: Example of the basic norm letter in Experiment One 
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Balance checks 
Table A1: Regression on predictors of treatment group membership, Experiment One 
 (I) (II) (III) 
 Male Age Initial debt 
    
Basic norm 0.002 0.018 -75.737 
Country norm -0.002 0.102 -134.526** 
Minority norm -0.007 0.192 -184.245** 
Gain  0.014*** 0.068 -56.327 
Loss 0.017*** 0.052 -29.904 
N 96,354 96,354 96,354 
 
 
Table A2: Regression on predictors of treatment group membership, Experiment Two 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Male Accountant Age Initial debt 
     
General descriptive norm -0.014** -0.008 -0.303 2.522 
Local descriptive norm 0.000 -0.006 -0.172 40.671 
Debt descriptive norm -0.001 0.004 -0.290 62.367 
Local + debt descriptive norm  -0.009 -0.009 0.006 -40.732 
Minority status -0.011 -0.014** -0.139 -104.698 
Minority descriptive norm -0.001 -0.009 -0.081 65.548 
Moral duty -0.006 -0.002 0.093 -20.592 
General injunctive norm -0.003 -0.003 -0.114 29.434 
Fraction injunctive norm -0.014** -0.004 0.014 -113.750* 
Percentage injunctive norm -0.005 0.000 -0.049 15.009 
Injunctive and descriptive norm -0.009 0.002 -0.094 69.173 
Additional information -0.006 0.001 -0.244 56.510 
Interest frame -0.008 -0.005 -0.264 52.555 
N 116,693 119,446 119,001 119,522 
Notes: The Control group is the omitted variable.  Robust standard errors were used, but are omitted owing to space 
constraints.  Regressions (I) and (II) are logistic, and regressions (III) and (IV) are OLS.  
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Survival analysis 
 
For Experiment One, we complemented our main regression specification with a survival analysis 
of the payment data. Figure A3 gives the Kaplan-Meier estimates for Experiment One. The dotted 
lines represent the three time periods in our study: the initial 23 day window; the 23-48 day 
period; and the 48+ day period. 
 
Figure A3: Kaplan-Meier estimates for Experiment One  
 
 
We then run log-rank tests for all treatment groups against the control group. We do this for four 
different time periods: for the whole study period, and then for each of the three different time 
periods separately (Table A3).   
 
Table A3: Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions, Experiment One  
 Entire period 0-23 days 23-48 days 48+ days 
 Expected Observed Expected Observed Expected Observed Expected Observed 
Control 13,648 13,813 6,417 6,330 5,156 5,032 2,075 2,081 
Basic 
norm 
13,563 13,653 6,598 6,773 4,842 4,718 2,123 2,090 
Country 
norm 
13,655 13,705 6,659 6,837 4,982 5,177 2,014 2,024 
Minority 
norm 
13,301 12,989 6,759 6,634 4,542 4,568 1,964 2,016 
Gain 13,486 13,413 6,549 6,408 4,927 4,926 2,010 1,996 
Loss 13,796 13,877 6,685 6,720 5,005 5,032 2,106 2,085 
P value of 
Pr<chi2  0.033  0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.715 
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This analysis indicates that there is a significant difference between treatment groups and control 
group for all time periods except the 48+ period. The survival analysis therefore produces similar 
results to the main regression, and also shows a decay in the treatment effects over time.   
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Threat perception survey 
 
This appendix gives a brief overview of a laboratory experiment conducted to investigate the 
mechanisms that may be generating the taxpayer responses to the experiment. In July 2013 we 
recruited 231 individuals in to the Decision Research Lab at the University of Chicago. We used 
the downtown laboratory and experimental subject lists, which meant that we recruited mainly the 
general population and not students. The median age of the participants was 27 years; the 
proportion of participants reporting themselves to be male was 54%. We recognise that the 
participants were not drawn from the same country as the taxpayers in the main field experiments, 
and therefore may have different attitudes to tax compliance and thus different reactions to the 
messages.  
Participants were first engaged in two rounds of experiments that focused on eliciting honest 
reporting of coin flips through messages that referred to acts of omission and commission; we do 
not present these results here. Participants were then asked three questions to establish their prior 
beliefs about tax compliance: 
What proportion of people do you think pay their income tax on time?  
In your opinion, what proportion of people think that everyone should pay their tax on time? 
How acceptable do you think it is to pay your tax late?  
After answering these questions, they were presented with the following text: 
Imagine that you have completed an income tax form, but you have not paid the amount you owe. 
The deadline for payment has passed, and you have received the following letter from the tax 
authority. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to view three of nine letters requesting payment of 
overdue tax owed to the Internal Revenue Service. As for the field experiment, these letters varied 
only by the wording of one statement (see Table A4). Given the smaller sample size, we were not 
able to test the full range of messages in the two field experiments. Instead, we selected seven of 
the messages from the field experiments, focusing mainly on descriptive norms. We also included 
two other messages that had featured in other field experiments, one of which is reported in 
Hallsworth et al. (2015). These two messages (“Omission” and “Monitoring”) represent a more 
deterrence-based approach – both state that the government will take action in relation to the debt 
- and therefore offer a useful point of comparison with the norm messages. However, they are not 
central to the purpose of the experiment. 
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Table A4: Messages presented to participants in laboratory experiment 
Group name Test phrase 
Country norm Nine out of ten people in the US pay their tax on time. 
Minority norm Nine out of ten people in the US pay their tax on time. You are currently in 
the very small minority of people who have not paid us yet. 
Minority status You are currently in the very small minority of people who have not paid us 
yet. 
Local descriptive norm The great majority of people in your local area pay their tax on time. 
Local and debt descriptive 
norm 
The great majority of people in your local area pay their tax on time. Most 
people with a debt like yours have paid it by now. 
Debt descriptive norm Most people with a debt like yours have paid it by now. 
Fraction injunctive norm Nine out of ten people agree that everyone in the US should pay their tax on 
time. 
Omission  Previously, we treated your lack of response as an oversight. Now, if you do 
not contact us, we will treat this as an active choice. 
Monitoring We will be checking how long it takes you to respond to this letter. 
 
Each participant was then asked five questions. These were structured around the main 
determinants of the AS model (probability of detection, severity of punishment), but also included 
a general threat measure and a measure of message specificity:  
1. How likely are you to pay the money to the government? 
Please give your answer out of 10, where 0 means you are certain not to pay and 10 means you 
are certain to pay. 
2. How certain is it that the government will catch you if you do not pay?  
Please give your answer out of 10, where 0 means certainty you will not be caught and 10 means 
certainty that you will be caught.  
3. How severe do you think the punishment would be if you are caught? 
Please give your answer out of 10, where 0 means no action and 10 means the maximum penalty 
possible.  
4. How specific is this letter to you personally? 
Please give your answer out of 10, where 0 means not at all specific and 10 means very specific.  
5. How threatened do you feel by this letter?  
Please give your answer out of 10, where 0 means not at all threatened and 10 means very 
threatened. 
 
Table A5 gives the results of an ordinary least squares regression on the participant’s scores, with 
the Country Norm message as the comparison group.  
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Table A5: Results from laboratory experiment on participant responses to tax letters 
 Response score 
Group name 1 – Likelihood 
of detection 
2 – Severity of 
punishment 
3 - Threat 4 – Specificity 
to recipient 
5 – Likelihood 
of paying 
Country norm 5.41 
(0.07) 
4.85 
(0.08) 
1.68 
(0.10) 
3.31 
(0.11) 
5.60 
(0.08) 
Minority norm 6.22 
(0.08) 
5.73 
(0.08) 
5.18* 
(0.11) 
3.78 
(0.11) 
5.56 
(0.10) 
Minority status 5.80 
(0.08) 
6.16 
(0.08) 
4.82* 
(0.11) 
2.82 
(0.11) 
5.28 
(0.08) 
Local descriptive 
norm 
6.27 
(0.07) 
6.08 
(0.08) 
5.39* 
(0.10) 
3.71 
(0.11) 
6.07 
(0.08) 
Local and debt 
descriptive norm 
5.89 
(0.07) 
6.07 
(0.07) 
5.72** 
(0.09) 
4.43 
(0.10) 
5.53 
(0.08) 
Debt descriptive 
norm 
5.85 
(0.08) 
5.57 
(0.09) 
3.31 
(0.11) 
3.07 
(0.13) 
5.33 
(0.08) 
Fraction injunctive 
norm 
6.26 
(0.07) 
5.43 
(0.08) 
3.63 
(0.11) 
3.66 
(0.12) 
6.71 
(0.08) 
Monitoring  6.11 
(0.07) 
6.29 
(0.08) 
5.90** 
(0.10) 
5.39 
(0.13) 
5.47 
(0.09) 
Omission  6.96+ 
(0.07) 
6.78* 
(0.07) 
7.50*** 
(0.09) 
6.71* 
(0.11) 
7.34 
(0.07) 
N† 693 693 693 693 693 
+ p <0.01, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, with individual fixed effects, clustered standard errors, and controls 
for gender, education level and income. The comparison group is the “Monitoring” letter. 
† Since the same participant saw three letters, this N represents the number of observations. Each participant’s unique 
identifier was retained as a control variable and the standard errors were clustered at the individual level. 
  
